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Overview 
This book outlines a unified theory of prudence and morality that merges a 
wide variety of findings in behavioral neuroscience with philosophically 
sophisticated normative theorizing. Chapter 1 lays out the emerging 
behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality. Chapter 2 then outlines 
a new theory of prudence as fairness to oneself across time. Chapter 3 then 
derives a revised version of my 2016 moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—
from this theory of prudence, showing how the theory of prudence defends 
Rightness as Fairness against various critiques and unifies prudence, 
morality, and justice. Chapter 4 then argues that this theory explains a variety 
of normative philosophical and empirical neuroscientific phenomena better 
than alternatives. Finally, Chapter 5 responds to potential objections and 
explores future research avenues. 
 
Chapter 1 - Outline of the Behavioral Neuroscience of Prudence and Morality: This chapter outlines the 
emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality, explaining how the findings raise normative 
and descriptive explanatory questions. It begins by detailing how prudential and moral cognition involve 
mental time-travel (the capacity to imaginatively simulate different possible pasts and futures), other-
perspective-taking (the capacity to imaginatively simulate other people’s perspectives), and risk-aversion. 
It then discusses 17 distinct regions of the human brain’s default mode network (DMN)—a region involved 
in daydreaming, mind-wandering, thinking about oneself and others, remembering the past, and 
imagining the future—that have been implicated in moral judgment and sensitivity across a wide variety 
of tasks. It also outlines how stimulation and inhibition of particular DMN regions and capacities, including 
the temporoparietal junction, have been found to have bidirectional effects on prudential and moral 
cognition and performance. Finally, it suggests the findings outlined raise normative questions about why 
particular brain regions and capacities should be involved in prudential and moral cognition, and 
descriptive questions about how they are involved in both forms of cognition, and how the findings 
summarized appear to cohere poorly with some dominant views in moral philosophy. 
 
Chapter 2 - Outline of a Theory of Prudence: This chapter outlines a new normative theory of prudence 
and descriptive psychological theory of prudential cognition. It begins from the common premise in the 
literature that prudence is normatively a matter of acting in ways that have the greatest-expected 
aggregate lifetime utility. It then contends that because life as a whole is profoundly uncertain, prudence 
requires acting on principles that are rational from a standpoint of radical diachronic uncertainty—from 
what Donald Bruckner calls a ‘Prudential Original Position’, a model similar to John Rawls’s famous original 
position, but where an individual agent is situated behind a veil of ignorance applied to their own life. 
Following Bruckner, I assume that minimax regret—the principle of acting in ways that minimize the 
maximum amount of regret an action might result in—is the most rational principle in the Prudential 
Original Position, and that this principle converges with maximizing expected aggregate lifetime utility the 
more an agent cares about the past and future. The chapter then constructs a detailed theory of how 
Bruckner’s account coheres with and appears supported by a specific form of ‘moral risk-aversion’ that 
prudent people typically engage in and progressively internalize across childhood, adolescence, and 
adulthood. 
 
Chapter 3 - Derivation of Morality from Prudence: This chapter derives and refines a novel normative 
moral theory and descriptive theory of moral psychology—Rightness as Fairness—from the theory of 
prudence defended in Chapter 2. It briefly summarizes Chapter 2’s finding that prudent agents typically 
internalize ‘moral risk-aversion’. It then outlines how this prudential psychology leads prudent agents to 
want to know how to act in ways they will not regret in morally salient cases, as well as to regard moral 
actions as the only types of actions that satisfy this prudential interest. It then uses these findings to 
defend a new derivation of my (2016) theory of morality, Rightness as Fairness, showing how the 
derivation successfully defends Rightness as Fairness against a variety of objections. The chapter also 
details how this book’s theory helps to substantiate the claim that Rightness as Fairness unifies a variety 
of competing moral frameworks: deontology, consequentialism, contractualism, and virtue ethics. Finally, 
the chapter shows how Chapter 2’s theory of prudence entails some revisions to Rightness as Fairness, 
including the adoption of a series of Rawlsian original positions to settle moral and social-political issues 
under ideal and nonideal circumstances—thus entailing a unified normative and descriptive psychological 
framework for prudence, morality, and justice. 
 
Chapter 4 - A Unified Neurofunctional Theory of Prudence and Morality?: This chapter utilizes seven 
principles of theory selection to compare the theory of prudence and morality advanced in this book to 
alternatives. It first argues that there are two possible ways that a theory of prudence and morality may 
explain relevant target phenomena: (1) as a normative teleofunctional explanation of why particular 
phenomena found in behavioral neuroscience should be the case and (2) as a descriptive functional 
explanation of how prudential and moral psychology actually function. It then argues that in order to 
evaluate how successful a theory is in both respects, theories of prudence and morality should be judged 
according to seven principles of theory selection adapted from the sciences, including principles of 
internal and external coherence, explanatory power, unity, parsimony, fruitfulness, and ‘firm 
observational foundations’. Finally, it outlines how this book’s unified theory of prudence and morality—
Prudence and Morality as Fairness to Oneself and Others—appears to satisfy all seven principles of theory 
selection more successfully than other existing normative moral theories and descriptive theories of moral 
psychology. 
 
Chapter 5 - Replies to Potential Concerns, and Avenues for Future Research: This chapter responds to 
potential concerns about this book's theory of prudence and morality. It first addresses the concern that 
the theory is overly speculative, arguing that the theory is normatively and descriptively promising and 
thus worthy of further philosophical and empirical examination. Next, it responds to the concern that the 
theory commits the naturalistic fallacy and violates the ‘is-ought gap’, arguing that the theory commits 
neither error. It then addresses the concern that there may be counterexamples to this book’s theory of 
prudence: individuals who appear to live in prudentially successful ways while not appearing to have 
internalized the form of ‘moral-risk aversion’ that Chapters 2 and 3 argued serve as the foundation for 
normative moral philosophy and descriptive moral psychology. The chapter argues that it is ultimately an 
empirical question whether such counterexamples are genuine and, by extension, whether there really 
are individuals to whom morality does not normatively apply—implications the chapter argues for taking 
seriously. Finally, it addresses the concern that my theory is at most a theory of how morality is prudent, 
not a theory of morality per se. 
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